Introduction
Equilibrium model of an dynamic economy extending over an in nite sequence of dates plays an important role in modern economic theory. The basic equilibrium concept in such model is the Arrow-Debreu (or Walrasian) competitive equilibrium. In an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium it is assumed that agents can simultaneously trade arbitrary consumption plans for the entire in nite and state-contingent future.
In most applications of a model a dynamic economy a market structure is used which is di erent from the Arrow-Debreu market structure. Instead of trading arbitrary consumption plans in simultaneous markets agents trade securities in sequential markets at every date, in every event. The importance of an ArrowDebreu equilibrium rests on the possibility o f implementing equilibrium allocations by trading suitable securities in sequential markets.
The idea of implementing an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocation by trading securities takes its origin in the classical paper by Arrow (1964) . Arrow p r o ved that every Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocation in a two-period economy can be implemented b y trading in spot commodity m a r k ets at every date and complete security markets in the rst period. The implementation in the Arrow's model is exact: the sets of equilibrium allocations in the two m a r k et structures are exactly the same. Du e and Huang (1985) extended the result of Arrow to an economy with continuous time (with nite time-horizon).
In this paper we i n vestigate the implementation of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocations in an in nite-time economy b y sequential trading of in nitely-lived securities. Wright (1987) studied a similar question with one-period-lived securities.
The crucial aspect of implementation in in nite-time security m a r k ets is the choice of feasibility constraints on agents' portfolio strategies. On the one hand, a feasibility constraint is necessary for without it agents would be able to borrow i n security markets and roll over the debt without ever repaying it (Ponzi scheme). On the other hand, a constraint cannot be too \tight" for it could prevent agents from using portfolio strategies that generate wealth transfers necessary to achieve a consumption plan of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Wright (1987) employs the wealth constraint which s a ys that a consumer cannot borrow more than the present value of her future endowments. He proved that exact implementation holds with one-period-lived securities: the set of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocations and the set of equilibrium allocations in sequential markets are the same.
The di culty in extending the implementation to in nitely-lived securities lies in the possibility of price bubbles in sequential markets. As pointed out by Huang and Werner (1999) , the wealth constraint g i v es rise to sequential equilibria with price bubbles on securities that are in zero supply. (It follows from Santos and Woodford (1997) that there cannot be price bubbles on short-lived securities or on long-lived securities in zero supply.) We p r o ve that if all securities are in strictly positive supply and security m a r k ets are complete, then the exact implementation of Arrow-Debreu equilibria obtains. If some securities are in zero supply, then Arrow-Debreu equilibria correspond to sequential equilibria with no price bubbles. Usually, there are also sequential equilibria with nonzero price bubbles. We show that these equilibria correspond to Arrow-Debreu equilibria with income transfers, where the transfers are given by the value of price bubbles on agents initial portfolio holdings.
We consider a second portfolio feasibility constraint: the bounded b orrowing constraint. Under this constraint the value of a consumer's portfolio normalized with respect to some reference portfolio has to be bounded from below. This portfolio constraint has a remarkable feature that there cannot be a price bubble in an sequential equilibrium independently of whether the supply of the securities is strictly positive or zero. We p r o ve that exact implementation of Arrow-Debreu equilibria holds under the bounded borrowing constraint.
The equlibrium theory in in nite-time economies (see Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1987)) has produced several versions of the concept of an ArrowDebreu equilibrium distinguished primarily by a speci cation of a consumption space and a space of prices. It is worth pointing out that Arrow-Debreu equilibria that, according to our results, can be implemented by s e q u e n tial trading of secu-rities have always countably additive prices. The concept of an equilibrium we employ is closely related to that of Peleg and Yaari (1971) .
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we p r o vide a speci cation of time and uncertainty. In section 3 we i n troduce the notion of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium and in section 4 we de ne a sequential equilibrium in security markets. We assume that there is a nite number of in nitely-lived agents and a a nite number of in nitely-lived securities available for trade at every date. In section 5 we state and prove our basic implementation results.
Time and Uncertainty
Time is discrete with in nite horizon and indexed by t = 0 1 : : : . Uncertainty is described by a set S of states of the world and an increasing sequence of nite partitions fF t g 1 t=0 of S. A state s 2 S speci es a complete history of the environment from date 0 to the in nite future. The partition F t speci es sets of states that can be veri ed by the information available at date t. A n e l e m e n t s t 2 F t is called a date-t event. We take F 0 = S so that there is no uncertainty at date 0.
This description of the uncertain environment c a n b e i n terpreted as an event tree. An 
Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium
There is a single consumption good at every date, in every event (see Section 6 for a discussion of an extension to multiple goods). A consumption plan is a scalar-valued process adapted to fF t g 1 The standard notion of an Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium is extended to our setting with in nitely many dates as follows: Prices are described by linear functional P which is positive a n d w ell de ned (and nite) on each consumer's initial endowment. We call such functional a pricing functional. It follows that a pricing functional is well de ned on the aggregate endowment ! and, since it is positive, also on each consumption plan satisfying 0 c !. I t m a y o r m a y not be well de ned on the entire space C. 
Sequential Equilibrium and Price Bubbles
The notion of sequential equilibrium applies to markets in which trade takes place at every date. We consider J in nitely-lived securities traded at every date.
Each security j is speci ed by a dividend process d j which is adapted to fF t g 1 t=0 and nonnegative. For at least one security j the dividend process d j is not eventually zero, that is, for each s (1) Consumers face feasibility constraints when choosing their portfolio strategies. Such constraints are necessary to prevent consumers from using Ponzi , see Huang and Werner (1999) . In the de nition of sequential equilibrium below the set of feasible portfolio strategies of consumer i is i . Speci c feasibility constraints will be introduced in later in this section.
A sequential equilibrium is a price process q and consumption-portfolio alloca- 
for every s t and r > t . Since dividends d j (s ) are nonnegative, we can take the limit on the right hand side of (5) as r goes to in nity a n d w e obtain that the present v alue (2) is well de ned and does not exceed the the price of the security.
The positive di erence between the price and the present v alue of security j is the price bubble on that security. W e denote the price bubble by j 
We h a ve t h a t j (s t ) 0. For use later, we note that (4) and (6) If the supply of securities is strictly positive, that is > > 0, then there cannot be nonzero price bubbles in a sequential equilibrium (Santos and Woodford (1997) ). However, if some securities are in zero supply, then nonzero price bubbles are possible.
To i n troduce the second portfolio feasibility constraint w e rst de ne a normalization of security prices. Whenever security price vector q(s t ) is positive and nonzero we can de ne the normalized s e curity price v e ctorq(s 
We refer to a sequential equilibrium in which each consumer's set of feasible portfolio strategies consists of all portfolio strategies satisfying (10) as a sequential equilibrium with bounded b orrowing.
There cannot be a nonzero price bubble in sequential equilibrium with bounded borrowing. 
If we m ultiply both sides of (11) Using (12) and (6) ing functional P are a n A rrow-Debreu equilibrium such that security markets are complete at prices q given by
then there exists a portfolio allocation f i g such that q and the allocation fc i i g are a s e quential equilibrium under the wealth constraint. We defer the proof of Theorem 5.1 until later in this section when we state and prove a more general theorem. Theorem 5.1 says that an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in which the implicit security prices with zero price bubbles make the security markets complete can be implemented as a sequential equilibrium under the wealth constraint. Our next result says that the implementation is exact when sequential equilibria with zero price bubbles are considered. We turn now our attention to sequential equilibria under the bounded borrowing constraint. It follows from Theorem 2.1 that there cannot be a nonzero price bubble in a sequential equilibrium with bounded borrowing. We h a ve Theorem 5.5. If consumption allocation fc i g and a countably additive pricing functional P are a n A rrow-Debreu equilibrium such that security markets are complete at prices q given by
and there exists a portfolio strategy which is bounded a n d , a r e a n A rrow-Debreu equilibrium.
A su cient condition for there being a bounded portfolio strategy satisfying (17) is that y is eventually bounded relative t o 
Since preferences are nonsatiated, the Arrow-Debreu budget constraint holds with equality in equilibrium, t h a t i s , P (c 
In light of (7) and (30), we h a ve 
Since sequential markets are complete at q, equations (27) and (33) imply that Proof of 5.5: Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 5:6 w e c a n s h o w t h a t f o r each consumer i the Arrow-Debreu budget set under countably additive pricing functional P coincides with the set of budget feasible consumptions in sequential markets at the security prices q speci ed by (16) under the bounded borrowing constraint. Particularly, since sequential markets are complete at q and P (! Among all such p o r t f o l i o p l a n s f i g consider those that satisfy (27). We claim that these plans clear security m a r k ets. To p r o ve our claim, summing (23) over all i, and using the market clearing condition for consumption (1), we obtain (28). Substituting (16) into (28) and using the fact that P is countably additive lead to (33). Since security m a r k ets are complete at q, equations (27) and (33) imply that 
